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Abstract 
What explains cross-national variation in wage inequality? Research in comparative political 
economy stresses the importance of the welfare state and wage coordination in reducing not 
only disposable income inequality but also gross earnings inequality. However, the cross-
national variation in gross earnings inequality between median and low income workers is at 
odds with this conventional wisdom: the German coordinated market economy is now more 
unequal in this type of inequality than the UK, a liberal market economy. To solve this puzzle, 
I argue that non-inclusive coordination benefits median but not bottom income workers and is 
as a result associated with higher – rather than lower - wage inequality. I find support for this 
argument using a large N quantitative analysis of wage inequality in a panel of Western 
European countries. Results are robust to the inclusion of numerous controls, country fixed 
effects, and also hold with a sample of OECD countries. Taken together these findings force us 
to reconsider the relationship between coordination and wage inequality at the bottom of the 
income distribution. 
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Introduction 
One of the most profound changes of the past three decades in the developed world is 
the significant rise in inequality after its relative decline in the post war years (Kenworthy and 
Pontusson, 2005). To explain the pattern and evolution of inequality, the economics literature 
stresses that a shift in the demand for skilled – relative to unskilled - workers has raised the 
wage skill premium of skilled - relative to non-skilled - workers (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1997, p. 647).1 However, wage inequality has increased even within skills group (Gottschalk 
and Smeeding, 1997, p. 645) and inequality in literacy explains only a small part of the variation 
in earnings inequality (Blau and Kahn, 2002; Freeman and Devroye, 2002). Despite common 
trends in technology, openness and education, there are important cross-national differences in 
gross earnings inequality even among comparatively similar Western European Economies.  
Explaining fully the cross-national variation in wage inequality therefore requires a 
political and institutional explanation (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). This is particularly 
true for the case of wage inequality between the 5th and the bottom 10th gross earnings deciles 
that has received significant attention by recent research in comparative political economy (e.g. 
Iversen (1999), Pontusson et al. (2002) and Rueda (2008)). Findings strongly confirm the 
importance of welfare state institutions, unions, partisanship and varieties of capitalism in 
explaining inequality. 
While valuable, the theoretical expectations of this literature now seem at odds with 
more recent cross-national patterns in this type of inequality. Specifically, some Coordinated 
Market Economies (CMEs), which were portrayed as an equally efficient - but more egalitarian 
- type of Capitalism compared to their liberal counterparts (Hall and Soskice, 2001), have 
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experienced particularly steep rises in wage inequality between the 5th and the bottom 10th gross 
earnings deciles. Using this measure, Germany is now more unequal than the UK, a typical 
Liberal Market Economy (LME). Similarly, Denmark which is characterized by generous 
welfare state policies and a strong union movement (Esping Andersen, 1990) now has higher 
levels of wage inequality at the bottom of the income distribution than Belgium or France.2  
To solve this puzzle, I argue that the higher levels of wage inequality one observes in 
some CMEs calls for a reconceptualization of the effect of coordination. Following the Varieties 
of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001), my starting point is that coordination 
on average enhances the productivity and wage bargaining power of employees. However, I 
argue further that one must distinguish between the degree of coordination of institutions and 
their degree of inclusiveness (cf. Thelen, 2012, p. 142, Thelen 2014). As a result, the degree to 
which coordination can theoretically be expected to affect distinct parts of the income 
distribution depends crucially on the degree of inclusiveness, understood here as how inclusive 
the ‘coordinating actor’ – i.e. unions - is.  
The higher coordination and the lower the inclusiveness, the bigger the income gap 
between median income workers - that benefit from the beneficial wage enhancing effects of 
coordination - and low income workers - that do not benefit from coordination. Where 
coordination is high but inclusiveness only covers median income workers and not bottom 
income decile workers, it is associated with higher wage inequality between those two groups. 
But where coordination is high and inclusive, it is associated with lower wage inequality. 
Distinguishing between inclusiveness and coordination suggests that high coordination is 
consistent with lower wage inequality only where unions are encompassing (e.g.: Sweden). 
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Where economic coordination is high but unions are less inclusive (e.g.: Germany), 
coordination is associated with higher wage inequality. Findings from several quantitative 
regression analyses of wage inequality in a panel of Western European countries in the last 
three decades strongly support my argument. The findings are robust to the inclusion of low 
coordination OECD countries. Taken together these results force us to rethink the relationship 
between coordination and wage inequality at the bottom of the income distribution. 
The rest of this paper enfolds as follows. The next section confronts the expectations 
from the literature to recent patterns of wage inequality and presents my argument. The second 
section then identifies other key factors that influence inequality, discusses the data and presents 
my empirical model. In the third section, I present the results from quantitative regression 
analyses that are consistent with my argument and discuss how these results match the 
experience of several European countries. The last section concludes with some implications 
for further research.  
 
1. Power resources, Coordination and the Puzzle of Wage Inequality at the 
Bottom of the Income Distribution 
1.1. Political and institutional determinants of wage inequality 
Two main approaches in comparative political economy have purported to explain 
patterns of wage inequality. The first, referred to as the power resource approach (Korpi, 2006), 
stresses the impact of the ideology of the political party in power on the level of inequality. Left 
control of the government can directly affect household disposable income through 
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redistribution. Left-wing parties can also indirectly affect the wage distribution by 
decommodifying labour: more generous social benefits and more regulated labour markets 
increase the reservation wage of workers and in turn reduce wage inequality. This argument is 
therefore contingent on whether the left does indeed increase welfare state spending. While 
some studies find that the left increases welfare state spending (Garrett, 1998) and that policies 
that reduce wage inequality are themselves undertaken more by left government (Rueda 2008), 
other authors contend that partisan differences over the welfare state are fading (Huber et al., 
1999; Pierson, 2001). .  
Besides political parties and welfare state policies, studies of wage inequality have also 
focused on the role of unions. While in principle unions could raise wage inequality by 
increasing the wage premium for union members only, while leaving the wages of non-
unionized workers unchanged, empirical evidence suggests that the presence of unions has 
overall equalizing effects (Freeman, 1980, 1982; Swensson, 1989; Freeman, 1993). Similarly, 
a high coverage of wage bargaining agreements mitigates the degree of wage inequality 
(Freeman and Katz, 1995; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; see Traxler and Brandl, 2009, for a review 
of the evidence).  
An alternative comparative political economy approach to explain inequality builds on 
the seminal contribution of the VoC literature, which analyses the relation between the type of 
capitalism and economic outcomes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). CMEs are argued to be as efficient 
as their liberal counterparts while achieving more egalitarian outcomes. They are crucially 
characterized by more coordinating wage bargaining institutions and more centralised unions 
than LMEs. Wage bargaining and union centralization, which are highest in CMEs, have in turn 
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been shown to have significant negative effects on wage inequality (Wallerstein, 1999; Card et 
al., 2003). 
CMEs are also characterized by more developed vocational education systems. This 
allows “students who are not academically strong” to nevertheless access jobs which provide 
them “with a stable economic future”, thereby minimizing wage inequality at the bottom of the 
income distribution (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001, pp. 156, 157). Rueda and Pontusson (2000) 
further show how the type of capitalism may also mediate the influence of various factors on 
wage inequality. Their analysis confirms wage bargaining centralization reduces wage 
inequality but the effect of centralization is stronger in CMEs. Union density is found to have 
a consistent (negative) effect on inequality in both LMEs and CMEs (ibid, p. 379). 
 
1.2. The Puzzle of inequality at the bottom of the income distribution 
Previous studies by Iversen (1999), Pontusson et al. (2002) and Rueda (2008) have 
looked specifically at wage inequality between the median and the bottom income deciles. Their 
results all show a strong and significant negative effect of wage bargaining centralization on 
wage inequality. Minimum wages, higher government employment and union density also 
reduce wage inequality. Unemployment and corporatism have ambiguous effects with the 
negative effect being significant only in certain specifications. The coefficient for partisanship, 
trade, the size of female labour force or of private sector services and monetary policy are not 
statistically significant (Iversen, 1999; Pontusson et al., 2002; and Rueda 2008).  
Given these expectations, European countries exhibited a surprising cross-national 
variation in this measure of wage inequality in 2005 (see Table 1). Whereas prior expectations 
7 
 
seem consistent with wage inequality between the top and bottom income deciles, a number of 
puzzling features are apparent when considering wage inequality between median and bottom 
income deciles workers. Denmark, despite its generous welfare state policies and strong union 
movement, has a higher wage inequality than countries with a Bismarckian welfare regime such 
as Belgium and France (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
The power resource approach and the welfare state regime literature suggest that 
countries with generous welfare state policies and a strong labour movement should have lower 
wage inequality (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 2006). However, Denmark had a higher level 
of union density than France, Belgium and Norway, and it had a higher expenditure on total 
public and mandatory private social expenditure as a % of GDP than Belgium. Similarly, the 
higher degree of centralization in Denmark than in France and Finland is hard to reconcile with 
the expectation from the literature that wage centralization reduces wage inequality. Last but 
not least, one cannot make sense of this higher inequality in Denmark with either openness 
which was higher in Belgium, or with the size of its public sector which was higher than in 
Finland and France.  
Even more striking, Germany, the archetype of a CME, has a higher wage inequality 
than LMEs such Ireland and the UK. The higher degree of coordination generally attributed to 
Germany is reflected by its higher degree of centralization and coordination (for a comparative 
index of economic coordination, see Hall and Gingerich, 2004). In sum, there is surprising 
variation in wage inequality both within and across welfare regimes and types of capitalism. 
This variation cannot be easily explained by the power resource or the VoC literatures nor is it 
a priori consistent with the findings of the three studies reviewed in Table 1. 
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< Insert table 1 here > 
1.3. Solving the puzzle of wage inequality 
Solving this puzzle requires reconceptualising the conditions under which coordination 
leads to lower wage inequality. The VoC literature expects CMEs to be more successful in 
mitigating wage inequality between median and low income workers because of more 
coordinated wage bargaining and a greater ability to raise the skills of low income workers. 
Estevez Abe et al. (2001, p. 177) for instance argue that wage inequality should be expected to 
be lower in CMEs because “young workers who are not academically inclined have career 
opportunities [in CMEs] that are largely missing in general skill systems [LMEs]”. The 
expectation from this literature is that CMEs should be associated with more egalitarian 
outcomes than non-CMEs.  
However, this is prima facie at odds with patterns of wage inequality at the lower end 
of the income distribution. Indeed, this type of wage inequality is now higher in Germany than 
in the UK. If differences in skill systems necessarily meant that low education workers fare 
relatively better in CMEs than their counterparts in LMEs, we would expect the gap in wages 
between medium and low education workers to be lower in CMEs. In fact, the results from the 
2006 Eurostat’s structure earnings survey contradicts this premise: the gap between the gross 
hourly earnings of low relative to medium education workers was about 55% in Germany and 
47% in Austria compared with 30% for the UK and 10% for Ireland. Similarly, almost 50% of 
German low-education full-time earners were low wage earners3 compared to slightly above 
40% for the UK.4 This directly contradicts the claim that inequality is lower in CMEs than 
LMEs because low skill workers fare better relative to median skill workers. 
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While having a specific skills system and high coordination might be conducive to lower 
wage inequality, it is clearly not sufficient. To understand why coordination might lead to 
greater wage inequality, it is important to distinguish the degree of coordination of an economy 
from the inclusiveness of its coordinating institutions. In making a conceptual distinction 
between the coordinating and equalizing effects of institutions, I follow  the distinction 
developed by Swank, Martin and Thelen (2008, p. 8) between coordination, the “extent to which 
actors rely on non-market coordination”, and egalitarianism, “egalitarian income and 
employment” (also see Thelen, 2014). As a result, both “high levels of equality with 
liberalization” and “declining solidarity in the context of continued significant coordination” 
represent possible paths (Thelen, 2012, p. 137). In turn, I argue that the degree of inclusiveness 
or ‘solidarity’ of coordination is crucially determined by the structure of the union movement: 
where unions are encompassing, coordination will be inclusive and will therefore benefit both 
median and low income workers. Where unions are not inclusive, coordination will benefit 
mostly median income workers and wage inequality will therefore be higher.  
The neoclassic economics literature has long showed that unions bargain higher wages 
for their members as opposed to non-members, a process commonly referred to as ‘union wage 
gap’ (Borjas, 2005, p. 428). There is a large body of evidence to substantiate the claim that there 
exists such a union wage premium (Freeman, 1984; Budd and Na, 1994; Hirsch, 2004). 
Coordination can reasonably be expected to lead to a bigger union wage gap by increasing both 
the bargaining power and productivity of workers. But where it is not inclusive, it only benefits 
median income workers, while leaving the wages of bottom income workers unchanged. 
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Inclusiveness is crucial because there are two contradicting effects at work. On the one 
hand, unionized workers earn more, everything else being equal, than their non-unionized 
counterparts and this effect is likely to be especially strong where coordination is high, but on 
the other hand, unions reduce wage inequality between their members (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984) and we know that their ability to do so has been more marked in CMEs (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Hancke et al., 2007). Which effect is strongest therefore depends ultimately on the degree 
of inclusiveness of coordination. I expect that high - and non-inclusive - coordination raises the 
wages of median income workers more than low – and non-inclusive - coordination. Since in 
both cases bottom decile workers are unaffected, but non-inclusive coordination does raise the 
wage of median income workers, wage inequality should be higher in the high and non-
inclusive coordination case than in the low and non-inclusive coordination case. Conversely, 
countries where coordination is high and inclusive will exhibit less wage inequality between 
median and bottom income deciles workers than countries with low coordination. 
Are unions doing the coordination likely to be inclusive and represent low and medium 
income workers equally well? If unions are more likely to unionize median and high income 
workers than low income workers, only unions which cover the vast majority of the workforce 
would have low income workers among their ranks. Existing evidence documents the over-
representation of the top quintile relative to the bottom quintile in most European countries 
(Becher and Pontusson, 2011 table 2). Checchi et al. (2007, pp. 17, 18) show that “trade unions 
mainly attract workers from the intermediate earnings group” and the probability of union 
membership falls as the income of the worker is further away from the median. This effect is 
stronger for workers with incomes below the median than those with incomes above the median 
and holds for the vast majority of European countries in their sample. If unions often do not 
11 
 
count among their members low income workers, higher coordination should increase the 
wages of median income workers more than of low income workers and should therefore lead 
to greater wage inequality between median and low income workers.  
Because my expectation is that the effect of economic coordination on wage inequality 
is contingent on the degree of inclusiveness, and the degree of inclusiveness of different 
coordinated countries has not evolved in the same direction (Thelen, 2012), one cannot predict 
a priori the effect of coordination. High coordination should be associated with higher wage 
inequality only if it enhances the productivity and bargaining power of median income workers, 
but with lower wage inequality if it is inclusive.  
The impact of coordination on the bottom part of the income distribution is - by itself, 
when ignoring inclusiveness -indeterminate and hence ultimately an empirical question. When 
considering inclusiveness, one can derive more specific expectations. In countries where high 
coordination is inclusive of all workers, coordination affects both bottom and median income 
workers and hence should be associated with lower wage inequality. Where coordination is not 
inclusive and only enhances the bargaining power of median income workers, it should be 
associated with greater wage inequality.  
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2. Testing the Effect of Coordination: The Mediating Role of Inclusiveness 
2.1. Key independent variables 
Coordination  
To test the effect of coordination I focus on the degree of wage coordination. This is 
adequate since economic coordination is most directly relevant to wage inequality in the domain 
of wage bargaining. It is also better than the alternative that would be to use a broader indicator 
of economic coordination such as the Hall Gingerich (2004) index of coordination. While the 
latter would provide a reasonable alternative proxy, it is time invariant and does not cover all a 
sufficient number of countries. Instead, I rely on Visser’s (2013) dataset that codes wage 
coordination between 1- company level (1) and 5- economy wide bargaining. I create a 
coordination index which takes value 1 if the Visser’s wage coordination index scores 4 or 5 
(high centralised wage coordination), and 0 otherwise (i.e. where the index scores 1 – 
fragmented wage bargaining, 2 – little or no pattern bargaining or 3 – informal firm or industry 
level bargaining).5 The rationale for dichotomising this variable is that wage bargaining should 
only reduce wage inequality when it is highly centralised and coordinated, whereas there is no 
a priori reason to expect differences between fragmented wage bargaining and little or no 
pattern bargaining. 
If the expectations from VoC are correct, this index should be negatively associated 
with wage inequality. By contrast, I expect this variable to be either insignificant because some 
coordinated economies have become less inclusive while others have not, or positively 
associated with wage inequality if economic coordination has become non-inclusive in most 
countries.  
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Inclusiveness 
My argument predicts that the effect of coordination on wage inequality is contingent 
on inclusiveness. I therefore need to allow for the interaction between coordination and 
inclusiveness. How should we measure inclusiveness?  Ideally one could use a measure of 
inclusiveness that captures the degree of unionisation of low income workers. Figure 1 plots 
wage inequality at the bottom of the income distribution and unionisation of the bottom income 
quintile for several Western European countries. The scatterplot shows that there is a negative 
relationship between union inclusiveness of the bottom income quintile and wage inequality. 
The figure also displays whether countries have high coordination (dark circles) or low 
coordination (gray diamonds). Consistent with my expectations, this shows that countries with 
high coordination and low inclusiveness exhibit higher wage inequality (the sub-group average 
is 1.82) than those with low coordination and low inclusiveness (the sub-group average is 1.60) 
while countries with high inclusiveness and high coordination exhibit the lowest wage 
inequality (the sub-group average is 1.46) 
Unfortunately, there is no yearly data for the unionisation of the bottom income quintile 
for a large number of countries in the last decades. As a proxy for inclusiveness I rely instead 
on union density because only unions with high union density are likely to represent low income 
workers in the coordination process. Figure 2 plots unionisation of the bottom income quintile 
and union density. Most countries are close to the 45 degree line and the correlation between 
the two variables is 0.96 (p-value: 0.0000). The correlation between union density and union 
density of workers strictly below the median income is also 0.96 (p-value: 0.0000) and overall 
union density is also highly correlated with union density of low income occupations such as 
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operators (see appendix 2). My expectation is that coordination increases wage inequality where 
union density is low but reduces wage inequality when union density is high. 6 
However, in many countries, the coverage of wage bargaining is higher than union 
density. As a result, union density is at best a good measure of ‘input inclusiveness’ (which 
actors are doing the coordinating) but not of ‘output inclusiveness’ (which actors are being 
coordinated). I therefore also test the mediating role of wage bargaining coverage that specifies 
the share of the workforce that is covered by a wage bargaining.7 
Finally, the effect of coordination on wage inequality also depends on ‘institutional 
inclusiveness’ that captures how the effect of coordination is mediated by institutions that affect 
the wages of bottom income workers. In many European countries, there are provisions for 
statutory minimum wage that require employers to pay a minimum wage to all workers. Thus, 
inclusiveness should have an especially strong mediating effect in countries that either do not 
have statutory minimum wages or where the level of the minimum wage is low. As a result, I 
also control for the relative level of the minimum wage in a country (relative to the median 
wage). 
< Insert figure 1 here > 
< Insert figure 2 here > 
2.2. Controls 
A first control is labour market dualization which captures differences in the  “rights, 
entitlements, and services provided” to insiders in permanent full-time employment and 
outsiders in precarious work or unemployment are increasingly differentiated (Emmenegger et 
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al., 2012, p. 10; see also Iversen and Soskice, 2009; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Vlandas, 2013a). 
To my knowledge, no attempts have so far been made to assess the quantitative effects of policy 
dualism on developments in wage inequality so I devise my own index of dualization. Here I 
focus on temporary work: the bigger the size of the temporary work sector and the less 
temporary workers are protected, the more dualized a labour market. I expect labour market 
dualization to lead to greater wage inequality among permanent workers. I create an index of 
dualization which is obtained by calculating the ratio of temporary work (as a share of the total 
labour force) divided by the index of employment protection legislation for temporary workers.  
In the power resource approach, the strength of the labour movement is a key 
determinant of labour market policies, such as generous unemployment benefits, and outcomes, 
such as lower unemployment and lower inequality (Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983; Esping-
Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 2006). Left-wing parties are seen to represent the interests of labour 
and hence will expand welfare state institutions in a way that is conducive to workers’ interests. 
The effect of policies that the left generally expands – for instance total social expenditures, 
benefit generosity, labour market policies, etc. – are then seen to lead to more egalitarian 
distributive outcomes (Bradley et al., 2003). The argument therefore has two observable 
implications: (1) that the left expands welfare state policies- which is contested (Rueda, 2007; 
Vlandas, 2013b) - and (2) that this leads to lower inequality. Given the lack of a clear causal 
mechanism linking the left to wage inequality, I do not include a control for the left in the 
baseline model (though I include it as a robustness check). Since the effect of the left operates 
through welfare state policies, I test for the effect of various welfare state policies on wage 
inequality.  
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A vast literature has argued that the welfare state serves to decommodify labour which 
should ceteris paribus reduce wage inequality (Esping Andersen, 1990). To investigate the 
impact of decommodifying welfare state policies on wage inequality, I focus on the 
unemployment benefit replacement rate in the first year of unemployment which is an important 
determinant of workers’ reservation wage.8 However, welfare states have also undergone 
profound reforms of the design of existing policies, for instance through activation (Clasen and 
Clegg, 2006; Daguerre, 2007), and new policies that are recommodifying such as in-work 
benefits have been introduced (Leppik, 2006; Vlandas, 2013c; Pierson, 2001). 
Recommodifying Labour Market Policies (RLMP) should be associated with higher rather than 
lower wage inequality because they incentivise workers to accept low income jobs. I focus on 
a sub-set of Active Labour Market Programs (ALMPs) – spending on employment incentives 
and rehabilitation as % of GDP – that incentivize unemployed workers to return to employment.  
Finally, I include several economic controls. While openness can be expected to 
increase wage inequality (Wood, 1994), the expectations for growth and unemployment are less 
clear. To the extent that unemployment puts downward pressure on low income workers, this 
could raise wage inequality. On the other hand, if low skill workers are priced out of the labour 
market as a result of institutions that prevent wages from falling too low (e.g.: minimum wage 
regulation) then unemployment might reduce wage inequality among employed workers 
(though not overall income inequality). Last but not least, I control for real GDP growth to 
account for the macroeconomic context (consistent with previous literature – e.g. Brady 2003 
or OECD 2011 that uses instead the output gap). 
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2.2. Empirical model, preliminary statistical tests and estimation method 
To maximise comparability, my analysis first runs regressions on a sample of fourteen 
Western European countries that are all part of the European Union, but I also report regression 
results for a larger sample of OECD countries. My sample covers the period 1977 to 2009, 
though the precise period depends partly on the specification and I therefore indicate for each 
regression model the time period which is covered.9 The baseline regression that is estimated 
for i countries in t years is as follows:  
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
More details on all the variables and their sources as well as descriptive statistics, can 
be found in the online appendix. A number of preliminary statistical tests were carried out to 
identify the correct estimation method.10 The null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit 
root is rejected, so I conclude that non-stationarity is not a problem. I nevertheless include a 
trend to control for time dynamics because non-stationary tests lack power (and I also try some 
specifications with time dummies). 
Heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation are present so the appropriate estimation 
method is robust standard error clustered by country. Multicollinearity tests were also 
undertaken on the main independent variables: variance inflation factors for my independent 
variables suggested multicollinearity is not a concern. The Hausman test suggests that country 
fixed effects should be included. However, I still run some regressions without fixed effects 
since these risks absorbing the cross-national variation that I seek to explain. As Plümper, 
Troeger, Manow (2005: 331) point out, “unit dummies completely absorb differences in the 
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level of independent variables across units”. Thus, the ‘level effect’ of my coordination variable 
is suppressed when including fixed country effects (ibid: 333). While the effect of a change in 
coordination on wage inequality is also theoretically relevant, my main concern here is about 
the effect of differences in the level of coordination and of inclusiveness across countries on 
wage inequality, which is why I also run random effects models.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. The determinants wage inequality in Western Europe 
Table 2 presents the regression results.11 I first report the results for a parsimonious 
model that includes my economic controls and coordination (column 1). None of the variables 
are significant. As expected, coordination has no independent effect on wage inequality. In 
column 2, I add union density and my dualization index: both have the expected signs (negative 
and positive respectively) and are statistically significant.12  
In Column 4, I substitute my dualization index by an index capturing the Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) of temporary work, which has better data availability since this 
index is more readily available than the share of temporary workers. The coefficient for this 
variable is significant and negative suggesting that higher regulation of temporary work is 
associated with lower wage inequality. Column 5 introduces country fixed effects: the 
regulation of the temporary work sector remains significant indicating that it also explains 
within country variation, whereas union density loses significance suggesting that it is the level 
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of union density that has an effect on cross-national variation (see Plümper, Troeger, Manow, 
2005: 333).  
I then introduce the unemployment benefit replacement rate which has a statistically 
significant negative association with wage inequality (column 6), regardless of whether country 
fixed effects are included (column 7). Relative minimum wages are also associated with lower 
wage inequality but spending on recommodifying labour market policies has a positive 
association with wage inequality (columns 8 and 9). Last but not least, consistent with my 
expectation, the index of coordination has no statistically significant effect on wage inequality 
throughout.  
< Insert table 2 here> 
I carry out a number of stability tests in Table A4.1 in appendix 4. When removing the 
control for minimum wages, recommodifying labour market policies lose statistical 
significance, but the other key independent variables remain significant. The results remain 
stable when time dummies are included instead of the trend. When I substitute EPL of 
temporary work by the dualization index, the results are unchanged. The control of the cabinet 
by the left has no impact, in line with the expectation that the effect of partisanship occurs 
through welfare state policies and regulations. Several other variables are not found to be 
statistically significant: stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP; EPL of regular 
workers; educational attainment of the total population aged 15 and over; inflation; and the 
share of foreign born population. Last but not least, I replace my dichotomous measure of wage 
coordination with the initial 5 points scale and the results are unchanged. None of these 
variables therefore alter my main results, though the coefficient of coordination becomes 
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significantly positive in some cases. In line with my expectations, unemployment benefit 
replacement rates and union density have a negative impact on wage inequality. Higher 
dualization (or lower temporary work regulation) is associated with higher wage inequality 
throughout. The findings for spending on recommodifying labour market policies is more 
mixed with statistical significance disappearing when relative minimum wages are excluded 
from the analysis. Coordination is either found to be insignificant or to have a significant 
positive effect on wage inequality. 
3.2. Contextualizing the effect of coordination in Western Europe 
My results so far suggest that coordination has either no effect or a positive effect on 
wage inequality, contradicting the expectations of VoC, but consistent with Germany’s high 
wage inequality. To test whether this positive effect is contingent on the degree of inclusiveness, 
I create a separate interaction term between coordination and union density. The results when 
this interaction term is included are reported in column 1 in Table 3. The unemployment benefit 
replacement rate, EPL of temporary work and the minimum wage all have significant negative 
association with wage inequality, as was the case before. By contrast, the coefficient for 
recommodifying labour market policies loses significance. 
Since one cannot readily interpret interaction terms from the table (Brambor et al., 
2006), Figure 3 plots the average marginal effect of coordination on wage inequality for 
different levels of union density. The figure suggests that economic coordination only reduces 
wage inequality where union density is high. Below 80% union density, the effect of 
coordination on wage inequality becomes insignificant; though note that most of the confidence 
interval lies in positive part of the y axis. Note that the results are the same if ‘output 
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inclusiveness’ – wage bargaining coverage - is used instead of union density (see Figure A4.2 
in appendix). 
In column 2, I allow for the interaction of union density and coordination with the 
relative minimum wage – i.e. a triple interaction term - to investigate how inclusiveness 
mediates the effect of coordination in countries that do not have a statutory minimum wage (i.e. 
where ‘institutional inclusiveness’ is low). High EPL of temporary work and high 
unemployment benefit replacement rates continue to have a negative association with wage 
inequality. Figure 4 plots the average marginal effect of coordination on wage inequality. The 
90% confidence interval is much narrower. Coordination continues to be negatively associated 
with wage inequality where union density is high, despite the absence of a statutory minimum 
wage. In contrast to the case where all countries were considered, coordination now is 
associated with statistically significant higher wage inequality where union density is less than 
70%. 
< Insert figure 3 about here > 
< Insert figure 4 about here > 
< Insert table 3 about here> 
 
3.3. Extending the sample to 20 OECD countries 
At this point of my analysis, two potential objections should be addressed. The first 
objection is that excluding from the analysis low coordination countries outside Europe, which 
often exhibit high wage inequality, biases the results in a way that would explain the surprising 
lack of statistical significance of coordination. While the puzzle is about Western European 
countries and those countries share similarities and constraints, thereby making them a good 
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sample to test my argument, extending the analysis to other OECD countries is necessary to 
investigate whether the results change and test the external validity of my analysis. A second 
objection is that one observable implication of my argument concerning the effect of 
coordination was not tested. Indeed, if coordination always raises the wages of median income 
workers but only increases the wages of the bottom income decile workers if coordination is 
inclusive, we should expect that coordination is associated with lower wage inequality between 
the median and the top income decile. 
To address both objections, I extend my analysis to an additional six OECD countries 
outside of Europe for which data is available: Japan, US, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and 
New Zealand; and I also test the effect coordination on this alternative measure which captures 
wage inequality in the upper half of the income distribution. Creating a sample with a consistent 
coverage across all twenty OECD countries13 partly limits my ability to test the effect of 
dualization because temporary work is not consistently available for such a sample.14 Instead, 
I test the effect of temporary work regulation. The results for this larger sample are the same 
and can be seen in table 4: relative minimum wage and the unemployment benefit replacement 
rate are associated with lower wage inequality, but union density is no longer statistically 
significant. Surprisingly, the unemployment rate is negatively associated with wage inequality 
consistent with the notion that low unemployment may mean that previously unemployed 
people with very low human capital now enter the job market and earn very low wages. In other 
words, this lower unemployment may be associated with higher wage inequality at the bottom 
of the income distribution despite reducing overall income inequality.15 
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Results when the ratio between top and median income deciles is used as the dependent 
variable are shown in columns 3 and 4. Consistent with my expectation that wage coordination 
has an unambiguously positive effect on the median decile, coordination is negatively 
associated with this measure of wage inequality. Similarly, union density has a statistically 
significant negative coefficient. However, the interaction term between union density and 
coordination is not significant for this dependent variable, consistent with my argument that 
higher union density helps low income workers to be better represented but does not affect 
dynamics between top and median income workers (not shown, results available from author). 
Finally, we can investigate various interaction effects (for reasons of space the full 
results are shown in supplementary appendix 5). Wage coordination is only associated with 
higher wage inequality where union density is less than 60% (Figure 5). To investigate the 
impact of ‘output inclusiveness’ I interact coordination with bargaining coverage instead of 
union density: the results suggest coordination only reduces wage inequality when ‘output 
inclusiveness’ is high (Figure 6). Where there is no statutory minimum wage (i.e. ‘institutional 
inclusiveness’ is low), the effect of coordination on wage inequality is sharper: below 60% 
coordination has a positive significant association with inequality, above 65% the association 
becomes negative (Figure 7). Both the non-interacted and the interacted results are robust to the 
inclusion of various additional variables as well as different operationalisation of openness and 
left power and unemployment benefits (see appendix 6). Finally, interacting union density with 
a 5 points instead of a dichotomous index of wage coordination does not change the results (see 
figure A7.4 in appendix 7). 
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< Insert table 4 about here> 
< Insert figure 5 about here > 
< Insert figure 6 about here > 
< Insert figure 7 about here > 
3.4. Going back to the country cases 
Though the specific experience of no single country case can perfectly match the results 
from a large N regression analysis, it is instructive to map how developments in several 
countries in my key variables relate to wage inquality. In the following paragraphs, I very 
briefly contrast the experience of Germany, the UK, Denmark, France and Sweden. 
Between 1985 and 2005, Germany’s coordination index stayed nearly all the time at 4, 
union density fell from 34.7% to 21.7%, unemployment benefit replacement rate fell marginally 
from 63% to 60%, spending on employment incentives increased from 0.13% to 0.17% of GDP, 
EPL for temporary workers fell from 3.75 to 1.25, while temporary work increased by 40% 
(from 10% to 14.2%). In the absence of a statutory minimum wage, these trends led to an 
increase in wage inequality. Thus, for instance, between 1995 and 2005, Germany’s ratio 
between median and bottom income deciles increased from 1.71 to 2. Thus, high coordination 
combined with low input, output and institutional inclusiveness has resulted in higher wage 
inequality between median and bottom income workers. 
In the UK, union density fell from 43.7% in 1975 to 27.1% in 2005. While coordination 
was sometimes 4 in the 1970s, it was consistently 1 from the 1980s onwards. Unemployment 
benefits decreased drastically (replacement rate fell from 47% in 1975 to 25% in 1985 and 21% 
in 1995, and to 18% in 2005). EPL of temporary workers and spending on employment 
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incentives are both low in comparative terms. While the wage inequality ratio increased 
between 1975 and 1995 (1.79 to 1.84), the introduction of the minimum wage in the late 1990s, 
and the absence of a positive effect of high coordination on the median wage, meant that the 
ratio between the median and bottom income workers fell to 1.83 in 2005. Thus low 
coordination combined with institutional, but not input or output inclusiveness, has resulted in 
lower wage inequality in the UK. 
In Denmark, wage inequality increased from 1.41 to 1.53 between 1985 and 2005, while 
union density fell from 78.2% to 71.7%, EPL for temporary workers fell from 3.13 to 1.38 and 
temporary work remained around 10%. At the same time Denmark spent an increasing amount 
on employment incentives and the unemployment benefits replacement rate fell from 74%in 
1985 to 57% in 2005. We can contrast the experience of Denmark with that of France where 
wage inequality fell from 1.74 in 1975 to 1.46 in 2005, despite low coordination and union 
density falling from 22.2% to 7.7% over the period. But France’s unemployment benefits 
replacement rate increased from 44% in the mid-1970s to around 70% from the mid-1980s 
onwards, and the minimum wage as a ratio of median earnings increased from 35% in mid1970s 
to more than 40% in 1990s. Thus, France despite having low coordination and lower input 
inclusiveness has managed with its higher output and institutional inclusiveness to have lower 
wage inequality than Denmark that had high coordination but lacked inclusiveness. 
Sweden is a highly coordinated country that retained high levels of input inclusiveness. 
Though it has low institutional inclusiveness (no statutory minimum wage), union density 
actually increased from 74.5% in 1975 to 81.3% in 1985 and 86.6% in 1995 while 
unemployment benefit replacement rates stayed around 80% in 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. As a 
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result, the ratio median to bottom income deciles remained under 1.4 throughout the whole 
period.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the political, institutional and economic determinants of 
wage inequality between median and bottom gross earnings deciles. The cross-national 
variation in this type of wage inequality across Western Europe seemed at odds with the main 
approaches in comparative political economy. Whereas the VoC literature has underscored the 
potential for CMEs to be as efficient as LMEs while achieving more egalitarian outcomes, 
Germany now has higher wage inequality between median and bottom income workers than 
the UK (see Table 1). 
To solve this puzzle, I argued that coordination might not reduce wage inequality where 
it is not inclusive: if it increases the productivity and bargaining power of median income 
workers much more than of low income workers, coordination should be associated with higher 
rather than lower wage inequality between median and bottom gross earnings deciles. 
Therefore, coordination can only be expected to reduce wage inequality where coordination is 
inclusive, and should instead be expected to increase wage inequality where it is not inclusive. 
My findings confirm that the effect of coordination depends on the degree of inclusiveness: 
coordination reduces wage inequality only where union density (or bargaining coverage) is 
high, and where union density is low and there are no statutory minimum wage, coordination 
is positively associated with wage inequality. 
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Moreover, the presence of decommodifying welfare state policies matter. By increasing 
the reservation wages of low income workers, high unemployment benefit replacement rates 
reduce wage inequality between median and bottom gross earnings deciles. By contrast, 
recommodifying policies such as employment incentives increases wage inequality between 
median and bottom gross earnings deciles.. I also find that labour market dualization is 
associated with higher wage inequality in Western Europe: a growing unregulated temporary 
work sector also has adverse effects on wage inequality between permanent workers. Increased 
dualization between insiders and outsiders therefore also exacerbates wage inequality between 
insiders.  
Recent research has shown that institutions have changed much more than initially 
assumed by the Varieties of Capitalism literature (e.g. Baccaro and Howell, 2011). 
Inclusiveness has been falling in many advanced economies over the last three decades, both in 
terms of union density and wage bargaining coverage. At the same time, the generosity of 
welfare state policies has decreased and this often understates the extent of recommodification. 
As a result, we can expect wage inequality to continue to rise, which may translate in higher 
overall inequality if the welfare state becomes increasingly constrained in its ability to correct 
market outcomes through direct redistribution. It does not follow that the State becomes 
irrelevant: even in a context of austerity, the State can intervene by introducing or increasing 
statutory minimum wages, extending wage bargaining agreements, and reregulating the 
temporary work sector. 
Overall my findings therefore contribute to the comparative political economy literature 
by qualifying and specifying in important respects the relationship between the welfare state, 
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inclusiveness, coordination and wage inequality between median and bottom gross earnings 
deciles. This paper suggests that the link between coordination, welfare state policies and 
egalitarianism in this measure of inequality is not straightforward. Further research should 
investigate this link for other types of inequality. Indeed, wage inequality by design only 
captures inequality among working people and the relationship between wage inequality and 
overall inequality is not straightforward: higher unemployment may for instance occur because 
low skilled workers are ‘priced out’ of the labour market, thereby resulting in lower wage 
inequality but potentially higher overall inequality. Disentangling the effects of coordination 
on overall inequality from those of inclusiveness may shed new light on the relationship 
between efficiency and equality and would therefore constitute a worthwhile avenue for further 
research.  
Word count without references and tables/figures: 8,162 
Word count with references (but without tables&figures): 9,626 
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Figures and tables 
Table 1: Pattern of wage inequality and current findings on determinants of wage inequality between 5th and bottom deciles 
Country 
50/10 wage 
inequality  
90/10 wage 
inequality 
Union density Centralization (c) Trade openness Public sector employees 
Germany 1.95 3.42 21.64 0.50 76.92 24.54 
Ireland 1.83 3.73 36.81 0.45 151.55 24.55 
UK 1.82 3.61 29.27 0.30 56.17 26.31 
Austria 1.70 3.25 33.00 0.76 104.40 24.58 
Spain 1.67 3.47 14.98 0.46 56.64 19.81 
Netherlands 1.65 2.90 21.92 0.60 130.72 28.06 
Portugal 1.61 4.30 n.a n.a 64.96 22.34 
Italy 1.61 2.5 (d) 33.77 0.35 51.96 22.75 
Denmark 1.53 2.64 71.70 0.44 93.07 32.33 
France 1.47 2.90 8.01 0.24 53.35 30.08 
Norway 1.46   2.11 54.87 0.52 72.80 n.a 
Finland 1.42 2.48 72.43 0.43 79.49 30.76 
Belgium 1.40 2.488 52.86 0.48 156.44 32.58 
Sweden 1.35 2.23 76.04 0.53 89.04 34.23 
Iversen (1999) 0/- --- 0 n.a. 
Pontusson et al (2002) - --- 0 (a) --- (b) 
Rueda (2008) n.a. --- 0 (a) --/-(b) 
Note: Values displayed are for 2005. 50/10 Inequality refers to wage inequality between the median and bottom deciles. 90/10 Inequality refers to wage inequality 
between the top and bottom deciles. Centralization and wage coordination are higher for higher values of the index.  ---, --, - negative effect at the 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels; 0 no significant effect. When results differ between specifications, both results are mentioned separated by /. 
(a) Use trade with least developed countries to test the effect of openness 
(b) Use government employees to proxy the size of public sector employment 
(c) Centralization of wage bargaining 
(d) 2004 value 
Source of variables: See appendix for data sources and description. Source for results of previous studies:  see Iversen (1999), Pontusson et al. (2002), Rueda 
(2008).   
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Table 2: The determinants of wage inequality in Western Europe 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unemployment rate -0.00526 -0.00864 -0.00832 -0.00225 -0.00650 -0.00305 -0.00718 -0.00402 -0.00416 
(lagged once) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Real GDP growth 0.00167 0.00580 0.00481 0.00608 0.00546 0.00476 0.00510 0.00444 0.00560 
(lagged once) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trade Openness 0.00087 0.00049 0.00151 -0.00015 0.00080 -0.00028 0.00046 0.00018 0.00016 
(lagged once) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Coordination index 0.00906 0.04822* 0.04685 0.02699 0.03130 0.02407 0.02927 0.02177 0.02036 
(dummy variable) (0.016) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Union density  -0.00329*** 0.00262 -0.00328*** 0.00428 -0.00287*** 0.00462 -0.00491*** -0.00513*** 
(from 0 to 100)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dualization index  0.00690*** 0.00496**       
  (0.002) (0.002)       
EPL     -0.03446** -0.02779* -0.03803*** -0.03395** -0.02846*** -0.02565*** 
(temporary work)    (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
UBRR      -0.21604*** -0.17224* -0.18391** -0.28012** 
      (0.082) (0.096) (0.085) (0.121) 
Relative minimum        -0.26343** -0.28771* 
wage (from 0 to 1)        (0.131) (0.151) 
RLMP          0.08726* 
          (0.049) 
Trend -0.00008 -0.00327 -0.00124 -0.00298 -0.00090 -0.00332* -0.00112 -0.00316* -0.00351* 
Constant 1.55744*** 1.73764*** 1.39368*** 1.88069*** 1.43920*** 2.02684*** 1.57579*** 2.08715*** 2.13454*** 
Time period 1977-2011 1986-2009 1986-2009 1986-2009 1986-2009 1986-2009 1986-2009 1986-2009 1986-2009 
Observations 280 190 190 210 210 210 210 210 202 
Number of 
countries 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Country FE 
included 
No No Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
Trend included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.14 
R-squared between 0.00 0.67 0.04 0.76 0.12 0.78 0.05 0.80 0.78 
R-squared overall 0.00 0.52 0.03 0.60 0.13 0.67 0.06 0.74 0.73 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. RLMP stands for Recommodifying Labour Market Policies. 
UBRR stands for Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rate.   
Table 3: Interaction between coordination, union density and minimum wages 
 
Column (1) (2) 
Unemployment rate (lagged once) -0.00492 -0.00121 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Real GDP growth (lagged once) 0.00631 0.00963 
 (0.007) (0.009) 
Trade Openness (lagged once) -0.00001 -0.00003 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Coordination index (dummy variable) 0.09595 0.32240*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) 
Union density (from 0 to 100) -0.00454*** -0.00534*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Coordination*Union density -0.00138* -0.00431*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Relative minimum wage -0.29374* -0.21939 
 (0.156) (0.347) 
Coordination*Relative minimum wage  -0.55674** 
  (0.240) 
Union density*Relative minimum wage  0.00760 
  (0.010) 
Coordination*Relative minimum wage*Union 
density 
 0.00066 
  (0.009) 
EPL (temporary contracts) -0.02867*** -0.06248*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) 
UBRR -0.27402** -0.24943** 
 (0.112) (0.126) 
Recommodifying labour market policies 0.07790 0.07247 
 (0.048) (0.058) 
Constant 2.11772*** 2.19403*** 
Time period 1986-2009 1986-2009 
Observations 202 202 
Number of countries 14 14 
Country fixed effects included No No 
Trend included Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.15 0.19 
R-squared between 0.78 0.87 
R-squared overall 0.75 0.80 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. . UBRR stands for Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rate. 
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Table 4: The determinants of wage inequality in the bottom and top of the income 
distribution in OECD countries 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Ratio of earnings decile limits of 
the 5th decile and the 1st decile 
Ratio of earnings decile limits of 
the 9th decile and the 5th decile 
Coordination index 0.00810 0.00758 -0.01866*** -0.01859** 
(dummy variable) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) 
Union density -0.00061 0.00027 -0.00224*** -0.00209** 
(from 0 to 100) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relative Minimum Wage -0.23319** -0.24795* -0.14759* -0.15303 
(from 0 to 1) (0.118) (0.131) (0.089) (0.091) 
UBRR -0.22144*** -0.22657*** -0.19349*** -0.19881*** 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.064) (0.064) 
Unemployment rate -0.00616*** -0.00661*** -0.00628*** -0.00638*** 
(lagged) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Real GDP growth 0.00305 0.00316 0.00233 0.00239 
(lagged) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trade openness 0.00040 0.00052 -0.00122** -0.00126** 
(lagged) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trend -0.00036 0.00006 0.00596*** 0.00605*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 1.84737*** 1.82581*** 2.04068*** 2.02413*** 
 (0.122) (0.121) (0.101) (0.066) 
Observations 387 387 387 387 
Time period 1975-2009 1975-2009 1975-2009 1975-2009 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No 
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.22 0.23 0.71 0.71 
R-squared between 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.05 
R-squared overall 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.19 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. UBRR stands for Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rate. 
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Figure 1: Unionisation of bottom income quintile, wage coordination and wage inequality 
between median and bottom income deciles 
 
 
 
Source: Unionisation of bottom quintile using 2006 and 2008 European Social Survey– see figure 2 for 
sources. For wage inequality and wage coordination, the year 2007 is used - see discussion in text and 
appendix. 
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Figure 2: Union density and unionisation of bottom quintile 
 
 
Source: Unionisation of bottom quintile is calculated using the 2006 and 2008 waves of the European 
Social Survey and is taken from Pontusson, J. (2013) Unionization, Inequality and Redistribution. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 51, 4: 797–825. Union density is for the year 2007 and is taken 
from Visser (see appendix for details of definition and source). 
 
 
 
  
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
Correlation = 0.9559 (p-value 0.0000)
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
U
n
io
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
b
o
tt
o
m
 q
u
in
ti
le
0 20 40 60 80
Union density
35 
 
Figure 3: Average marginal effect of coordination on wage inequality in Western Europe at 
different levels of union density 
 
 
Note: shaded area represents 90% confidence interval. The average marginal effect of coordination for 
different levels of union density is calculated using the results from column 1, table 4.  
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Figure 4: Average marginal effect of coordination on wage inequality in Western Europe at 
different levels of union density where there is no statutory minimum wage 
 
 
Note: shaded area represents 90% confidence interval. The average marginal effect of coordination for 
different levels of union density where there are no minimum wage regulations is calculated using the 
results from column 2, table 4.  
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Figure 5: Average marginal effect of coordination on wage inequality in OECD 
countries at different levels of union density 
 
 
Note: shaded area represents 90% confidence interval, plot of marginal effects using column 
1, table A5.1. 
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Figure 6: Average marginal effect of wage coordination on wage inequality in OECD 
countries at different levels of bargaining coverage 
 
 
Note: shaded area represents 90% confidence interval.  Plot of marginal effects using same 
regression model as in column 1, table A5.1, but substituting union density by bargaining 
coverage. 
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Figure 7: Average marginal effect of coordination on wage inequality in OECD 
countries at different levels of union density where there is no statutory national 
minimum wage 
 
 
Note: shaded area represents 90% confidence interval. Plot of marginal effects using column 
2, table A5.1, where the relative minimum wage is 0 (i.e.: there are no national statutory 
minimum wage). 
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Endnotes 
1 This shift was the result of changes in the prevailing technology (Freeman and Katz, 1995; Blau and 
Kahn, 1996; Goldin and Katz, 1996; Acemoglu, 2002), the structure of employment (Levy and Murnane, 
1992), rising trade competition (Wood, 1994; Burtless, 1995; Freeman, 1995), and immigration (Borjas 
et al., 1997; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000, p. 357). 
2 The figures for France are net (see appendix) so they are not directly comparable (many thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me). However note that France has one of the highest 
minimum wage legislation in Western Europe, and other studies have shown that the ratio of median to 
bottom income earnings is indeed very low. I have also recalculated my results without France and they 
are unchanged (results available from the author). 
3 “A full-time employee is defined as a low-wage earner when his/her annual gross earnings are less 
than two thirds of the annual full-time median gross earnings” (page 6, Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 
2010, accessed at: 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-003/EN/KS-SF-10-003-EN.PDF) 
4 These figures are taken from the Eurostat statistic in focus, see endnote 4. 
5 See Visser’s codebook, endnote 6. 
6 One variable which is not captured here but that could affect wage inequality is trade union ideology 
- for which there is no reliable data for my whole sample over time. This is only a problem if there is a 
very strong correlation between union density and egalitarian ideology.  For instance, an egalitarian 
ideology seems more prevalent in Sweden than in Germany (Dolvik and Stokke 1998, Jacobi et al 
1998: 218) and union density is higher in Sweden than in Germany (I thank a reviewer for raising this 
point). However, it is not obvious that there is necessarily a statistical correlation between the two. 
Indeed, elsewhere I have created a variable capturing the working class ideology of unions (arguably 
not a perfect proxy) and union density for a sample of western European countries after 2000 (Benassi 
and Vlandas, 2016) and the correlation between the two variables is less than 0.1, so an omitted 
variable bias is unlikely to be a problem. 
7 This has the additional advantage of allowing us to be sure that inclusiveness is what matters for 
wage inequality. In the power resource approach, union density is often construed as an indicator of 
union strength rather than inclusiveness. It is therefore difficult to rule out that it is union strength 
rather than inclusiveness that explains the negative correlation between union density and wage 
inequality (I thank a reviewer for raising this point). However, there is no a priori reason that strength 
should mediate the effect of coordination on wage inequality. 
8 While the replacement rate after the first year of unemployment could also matter, there are two 
problems with it. First, the replacement rate after the first year also captures the duration of benefits 
rather than their level. Second, most workers exit unemployment within one year. In any case, data 
availability for the replacement rate after the first is very limited. 
9 See appendix 3 in supplementary material for details on years available for each variable. 
10 The results are reported in appendix 3 in the supplementary material. 
11 My results do not change if the trend which I include in certain models is excluded, nor if GDP 
growth is excluded. I have further rerun my key regressions without France – which has a different 
measure of wage inequality that is net rather than gross – and my key results are unchanged. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these robustness checks. 
12 Note that data for these variables only starts in the mid-1980s so the number of observations drops 
slightly. 
13 The original fourteen western European countries plus Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
Japan and the United States. 
14 See Table A2.2 in the online supplementary material for details on the time period by country available 
for each independent variable. 
15 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretation of this finding. 
                                                 
